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The Mexican citizens of the town, though they professed to be
hearty in the cause of the revolution, were yet fearful of compromising
themselves too far, and had removed to some ranch about fifteen miles
below. The garrison here before we came
numbered about three hundred. Our
company and some others that soon after came in, increased it to upwards of
four hundred. J. W. Fannin, Col. and
Commander in Chief; William Ward, Lieut. Col. of the Georgia Battalion and
second in command. In order to properly
appreciate, or ever fully understand subsequent occurrences it is necessary to
take a cursory glance at the position of Texas and the sentiments of the people
in regard to the same. They had, for
reason to justify them, resented the aggression of Mexico, and so far, with
complete success, defeated and driving back the troops sent to reduce them to
subjection. But they still professed
allegiance to and adhered to the constitution of 1824. And although Santa Ana had by force and
fraud subdued every other Mexican State, and brought them under the dominion of
his “centralized” government, in total disregard of that constitution it was
thought by many in Texas if a firm stand was here made in its behalf, that the
neighboring Mexican States, or at least many of their people would rally in the
cause aid in resisting the establishment of despotism over them. With such aid they consider success as
certain. Without it the great disparity
of force between Mexico and Texas, the former having a population of eight
millions, the latte had hardly twenty thousand, made them regard a contest as
hazardous in the extreme, and disposed them to avoid a total rupture as long as
possible. Others looked upon
independence from Mexico, or being driven from the country, as the only
alternatives presented. Their recent
success had inspired them with enthusiasm and courage and they confidently
looked for large assistance from their brethren from the north. Under these circumstances, the people had
appointed a “Provisional Government” Consisting of a Governor and council, and
general Houston was selected as Commander in Chief of the Army. His policy was cautious rather than
venturesome. It was to prepare by
proper organization, a sufficient force to husband the resources of the
country, and not to waste them in detached and isolated expeditions which
however brilliant they might appear, could have but little effect on the
general struggle. To conciliate the
various Indian tribes, and obtain at least their neutrality, if not their
assistance. To collect all possible
means of aid, and wait prepared for the invasion. He was sustained by the opinion of Gov. Smith, but unfortunately
Lieut. Gov. Robinson and the council held different views, and there were many
restless, ambitious men in the country fond of enterprise and adventure, who
could not well brook the cautious and tardy steps of a defensive policy. The Governor and his council broke into a
disgraceful quarrel. The council
encouraged and promoted the attempts of sundry persons to make military
excursions into Mexico, to harass that country and if possible to capture some
of the towns on the Rio Grande.
Matamoras was aimed at. Dr.
James M. Grant, who had extensive acquaintance with Mexicans of high standing
and liberal views and who had been assured by them of their co-operation if
movement should be made in that quarter had in connection with Col. F. W.
Johnson, left San Antonio with several hundred men, and well supplied with arms
and ammunition, and proceeded westward, expecting the co-operation of Col.
Fannin, whom the council had appointed a Military Agent, and who was to meet
them at Copano on the Aransas Bay. At
Refugio however, Gen. Houston had visited the camp and had succeeded in
dissuading the most of the volunteers from the enterprise. But sixty or seventy of the men had gone
with Col. Johnson and were at the time between the Nueces and the Rio Grande. Col. Fannin remained at Copano until he received information
that the Mexican army in large force was advancing, when he fell back with his
troops to Goliad (having been elected to their command as Colonel) with the
express intention of strengthening its fortifications and defending it to the
last. Col. Travis, who had recently been joined by the celebrated
David Crockett, and who had also with him Col. Bowie and Col. Bonham, had
resolved to defend the Alamo fortress, at San Antonio, or Bexar, with about one
hundred and twenty men. Thus the
auxiliary volunteers were disposed of, numbering all about six hundred
men. The citizens after the capture of
San Antonio in December, had generally returned to their homes, but were ready
to turn out on the approach oft the enemy.
Gen. Houston had done what he could to dissuade the volunteers from what
he considered a rash and hazardous undertaking. He was also in favor of destroying the fortress of Goliad and the
Alamo; of keeping up scouting parties west of San Antonio, for procuring
intelligence and so disposing of the volunteer force that they would be ready
to sustain and be sustained by the citizens and thus to effect a steady and
systematic resistance to the enemy.
Goliad and the Alamo were no more than mere military stations. Situated in an open prairie country, they
controlled no passes, nor obstructed any route that could check or impede the
march of an army. They simply defended
what ground they stood upon, and what their guns could reach, and no more, and
they were from fifty to seventy miles distant from any settlements upon which
they could rely for supplies and succor. I found life in Garrison at first very pleasant. We were abundantly supplied with provisions
and almost every man had his rifle and brace of pistols, and besides there were
a number of good English muskets captured from the Mexican and we had five or
six pieces of artillery. The men for
the most part were altogether superior to the ordinary material of an army, in
intelligence and education. They were
far from being a class of mercenaries, but were men of character and standing
and some of them, of wealth, who had left their homes from sympathy for a
people who had taken arms for their liberty.
The novelty of the same was pleasure; for some days I performed the duty
of a private soldier, standing guard, attending to the mess &c., when I was
appointed by Col. Fannin, surgeon to his command. There were but a few sick when I took charge of that department,
consequently the duty was not heavy, and for a time all things went on
smoothly. Many of our volunteers were
from the state of Georgia and they had organized the “Georgia Battalion,”
electing to the command Warren Mitchel, as Major; Wm. Ward had been elected
Lieutenant Colonel, and was second in command.
The remainder were now formed into another called the
“Lafayette-Batallion,” and Benj. C. Wallace was elected Major. The walls of the fort were strengthened, where there was need,
and a bastion built at each end of the southern angles. A covered way was constructed from the rear
of the fort down to the river, about two hundred yards, for the purpose of
having secure passage across to the water in case of an emergency. Having thus prepared ourselves, we awaited with confidence the advance of the enemy. Prepared as we were we fully believed ourselves able to make a stand against many times our numbers, not doubting but being attacked, the citizens would at once come to our support and enable us to maintain the fort, or falling in that to fall back upon some other position and continue the resistance until it should ultimately be successful. As yet the clouds of war had only lowered in the distance, but they were destined to approach. About the latter part of February, Col. Johnson with two or three others came in, fleeing from San Patricio, where they had barely escaped with their lives, Gen. Urea, advancing with his division of three thousand managed to surprise Grant and Johnson's parties, at two different points, and killed nearly all, among them Dr. Grant and thus annihilated what might be termed the first outpost. The settlers at San Patricio were mainly composed of Irish Catholics and remained at and sought protection of the Mexican army. Those at Refugio were also Irish Catholics, but the most part had warmly taken the side of the Americans, and their families and property were now in danger. They began to move eastward but were forced to leave their stock, their main property, behind. Many of their families past through Goliad, being assisted by Col. Fannin, as far as in his power. He warned all of the coming danger, and urged them all to remove while they yet had time. Some however were so inconsiderate as to delay until the very last, and then became involved in the trouble that finally came over us all. When Santa Anna reached San Antonio with his main division of five thousand men, and drove Travis into the Alamo, the latter immediately dispatched messengers to the interior and to Col. Fannin for assistance. A party of about thirty men turned out from Gonzales and made a rapid march and succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy, and joining Col. Travis in the Alamo. Fannin and his officers were at first, prompt to respond to the summons. He left Captain Westover's company of regulars to defend the fort and with the resst of his force started his march to San Antonio. He crossed the river an encamped for the night on the north side. Here a further consideration of the enterprise served to display it in its true light. With but three or four hundred men, mostly on foot, with a limited supply of provisions, to march a distance of nearly one hundred miles through uninhabited country, for the purpose of relieving a fortress beleaguered by five thousand men was madness. Many Americans believed themselves to be able to cope with five times their number, and events in many instances justified the idea, but the disparity here was out of all reason. Besides the Mexican army was well appointed with cavalry and artillery, and their scouts would give them the earliest intelligence and they could select any advantageous on the route and cut us off. Indeed it been subsequently found out that they were appraised of Fannin's movements, and had made their plan to attack us in the road. More than all that, was there the least chance of relieving the Alamo, and successfully maintaining it? Yet this measure actually abandoning Goliad to Urea, without a blow. There was not a hundred men left there and Urea would have nothing to do but march in and take possession. After full deliberation, Fannin and his officers abandoned the expedition and as impractical and useless; we therefore returned to the fort and resumed our old quarters. The sign of coming danger began to produce a feeling of anxiety. Which was further increased by other vague and groundless rumors that circulated among the men. The confinement in the garrison became irksome. Our provisions which we had first an abundant supply were becoming short. The restraints of discipline now more necessary than ever in their enforcement, produced discontent and murmurs, and a loss of confidence in their commander. The practicality and utility of maintaining such forts as it was in the wilderness were fully discussed. Fannin was not slow to perceive the felling coming over the men, and it caused a corresponding depression of his mind. Whatever he had had an enterprise of activity that required prompt courage to overcome danger and win success, he had sustained himself and acquired the confidence of his men. Bu this position was getting perplexed now, and dangerous. The loss of Grant and Johnson's men; the now certain anticipation of the loss of the Alamo and the delay in the people turning out to defend the frontier where so much was at stake, serving to cover our prospects with a gloom that depended more and more, and was destined not to be expelled until after unparalleled scenes of barbarity and murder had been perpetrated, and the country deluged with blood. Thursday, March 10, '36, a party of sixteen or eighteen men of Captain Shackelford's company, under the command of Lieutenant Francis, were ordered to the ranchos occupied by the citizens of Goliad, and about fifteen miles below the town. The principle object was to investigate some reports of there being Mexican soldiers among them as spies, who were gaining intelligence of our movements and designs, to report to the enemy. Tired if the monotony of our life in the fort, and wishing for some exercise in the open country, I obtained leave to go with them. The expedition was of no importance in itself and would have passed into oblivion had it not been that I have preserved the notes I then made, and thus enabled me to fix with certainty the dates of subsequent occurrences. I had kept a regular journal up to this time, but afterward lost it, together with other papers and some clothing at the time of our battle and capture. These notes had remained in pocket, where I providentially discovered them. After loosing everything else, and have carefully preserved them until this time. We left the fort and went down on the west side of the river six miles, to a creek called the Candia and halted. We here met with some teams, loaded with corn for the fort, a drove of cattle for the same destination were also taken by. We went on about three miles further, and camped in a thicket. Friday, 11 - Left early and went to some cabins, but discovered nothing to confirm our suspicions.
We then, after procuring something to eat, went down a few miles further and crossed over the river to where the absconded citizens of Goliad were living. They received us kindly, and treated us with hospitality, professed the warmest hospitality to our cause, and denied having any communication with the Mexican army. They gave us a reason for leaving town and coming here, that many of the volunteers were unruly and turbulent, disposed to impose on them and their families, and that to avoid any quarrels with them they had removed. They succeeded in blinding us as to their real dispositions and we remained with them that night. Saturday, March 12 - After getting breakfast, we turned our faces toward the fort and went up on the east side of the river. We got back a little after middle of the day and found that some important movements had been made during our absence, to-wit: After our party left the fort on the evening of the 10th, either that evening or the next morning an urgent message came from a Mr. Ayres at Refugio, requesting that a guard might be sent down to assist him in bringing off family, as Mexican soldiers were making their appearance in the vicinity, and he was apprehensive of danger without some protection. Why he had not removed before, or whether any blame could justify be attached to him for not doing so, I never learned. Still Fannin felt it his duty to afford all the protection in his power and forth with dispatched Captain King, of the Georgia battalion with his company of twenty three men to his assistance. The distance to Refugio was thirty miles and King on his arrival found himself confronted by a superior force, that drove him into the old church of the Mission. Here he made a stand, and contrived to send a message back to Goliad for reinforcement. The messenger came in, and early this morning, before daylight, the Georgia battalion, about one hundred and fifty men, commanded by Col. Ward, was on its way to Kings relief. When that was effected, they were to return immediately, and they were looked for back in the morrow. News had also come in the fall of the Alamo and the slaughter of every one of its defenders. About this time, certainly before to-day came in the order from Gen. Houston to Col. Fannin, to retreat to Victoria. This was the first and only communication had from Gen. Houston, while he was at Goliad. In fact it was the first intimation we had of his whereabouts. The necessity of a retreat was now palpable to all. So far from Col. Fannin wishing to disobey the order, I know from his own lips that he intended to conform to it as soon as the Georgia battalion should return; and I had heard from him before this express a wish that Gen. Houston would come on and take command of the troops. The alleged disobedience of Col. Fannin to Gen. Houston's order, is an undeserved censure on a gallant soldier, and that he wrote back a refusal I know to be false. Circumstances enable me to posses a positive knowledge on these points, and justice to both the dead and the living of me thus to state it. Thursday 17 - We were no in a state of intense anxiety respecting the fact that our comrades; nothing had been heard from them since they left us on Sunday morning and none of our messengers had returned. We were convinced that some calamity had befallen them, and of its nature and extent we now had gloomy apprehensions.
At length, about 4, p. m., Captain Frazer, true to his word, arrived, and gave us full and explicit information and the following report: Col. Ward had reached Refugio and relieved Captain King. Instead of immediately turning back they unfortunately delayed their return, and Captain King started off with his company to destroy some ranchos, where the people had showed hostility. Col. Ward was soon after attacked by a body of Mexican troops and driven into the church from which he had but a short time released Captain King. He now found that Urea, with his whole division was about him, and endeavoring to dislodge him from his position in the church. Ward and his men gallantly defended them selves, and repulsed all attacks made upon them; when night came, finding their ammunition exhausted they succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the Mexicans, silently left the Church and retreated upon the coast. Captain King, upon reaching the rancho he intended to destroy, met with opposition and got rather worsted in the fight. He made a circuit to get back to Refugio, reached it in the night and found it occupied by the Mexicans. They then crossed the river and endeavored to retreat from the place, but got lost on the prairie and after wondering all night, found themselves at place called Malone's rancho. They had been watched and followed by a party of spies, and soon a force was around them that made resistance useless. They surrendered, and were immediately started toward Goliad
They had proceeded but a few hundred yards, when a halt was made in the prairie; King and his comrades were taken out and shot. Such was the results of this expedition.
Fannin and his officers immediately had a council, and without any hesitation resolved to commence our retreat the next morning. Hardly had they left the council room, when some of our scouts came in with information of a large force of the enemy in the vicinity. Preparations were made for leaving, and patrols were kept out all night, to watch and give notice of any movement that might be made by the enemy.
Friday 18 - This morning while taking the necessary measures for a retreat with accordance with the resolutions of the officers in the council last evening, a party of the enemy were discovered reconnoitering in the vicinity of the fort. Col. Horton with a few horsemen sallied out to engage them. They did not wait for an attack but fled, followed by Horton, until a large body of the enemy appeared, who in their turn chased him and his party back.
He then sent into the fort for all the horsemen who turned out to his assistance, and enabled him to resume the offensive. As the affair was nearly all visible from the fort, it produced considerable excitement, and all left their work to see the "sport." I went with several others to the top of the church which commanded a fine view of the country for several miles around.
Col. Horton now giving chase to his late pursuers, followed them over the north side of the river, and on over the prairie; occasionally a shot was fired, until the parties were lost from out view in the distance.
After a while they made their appearance coming back, but now the conditions were again changed. The Mexicans were following our men and pressing rather hard; but they succeeded in reaching the old Aranama, a mission, and getting under shelter of its walls, made a stand.
This was one of the old Spanish Missionary stations, now in ruins, and standing about three fourths of a mile northerly from the fort of LaBahia, and on the north side of the river.
The Mexicans numbering about one hundred, drew up in front at a safe distance and opened a fire which was returned.
Capt. Shackelford, now started out with his company to relieve Col. Horton, and our artillery men got one of their guns mounted on the wall and brought to bear on the Mexican party. A shot was fired at them, which fell short, but they thought it wise to draw off. They soon disappeared and we saw no more of them. Col. left his position to return, and met the company going to his rescue with warm greetings, (They had forded the river and gone half way to him) and with them returned to the fort in the highest of spirits. The events of the day had animated all, and good humor and cheerfulness for a while prevailed. Thus far, the events of the day were perhaps beneficial, but alas! other considerations were forced unwillingly upon our minds: the day was when time with us was precious and our retreat was necessarily postponed until the morrow. The horses were jaded and tired down and our oxen that had been gotten up to draw the canon and baggage carts, were left all day without food. And we had given the enemy a day of our invaluable time in which to select his positions and perfect his arrangements for our destruction.
I never heard that any man on either side had been injured in the skirmishing.
Although fully determined from the necessity of the case, on retreating, we were by no means disposed to run. We confidently counted on our ability to take ourselves and our baggage, in safety to Victoria. We still had about two hundred and seventy men, besides Co. Horton's company in all about three hundred; and though mishaps had come on thick and fast, still we had confidence and determination.
The necessary night guards were put on for the night, during which we had some rain. Some alarms occurred, but they proved groundless.
On to March 27, 1836
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